The social cost of climate change is unknown and may remain so in the next 50-100 years. We develop a tractable stochastic climate-economy model with a hidden-state impact process to show that climate policies are extremely robust to delays of hard information. Taking a dataset of estimates for the social cost as a representation of current beliefs on impacts, our quantitative assessment shows that the carbon price should rise with income for the coming century, even without observed impacts. The carbon price should grow faster than the economy as long as climate warming is not enough for generating impacts that are informative about the true social cost.
"Estimating impacts has been the most difficult part of all climate science" -William W.D. Nordhaus, EAERE lecture 2012
Introduction
A price for carbon measures the social cost of releasing a unit of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere, based on expected climate-change impacts. 1 However, there is little or no quantitative information on the impacts of persistent climate change on our economies, although there is extensive research on what such impacts might be. 2 The social cost of carbon is based on beliefs about impacts that will be updated when the "climate experiment" generates actual impacts. But this can take a long period of time; the past century of carbon emissions has not yet led to precise estimates, and another 50-100 years may pass without additional hard evidence on the ultimate consequences of current emissions. In view of such time delays for evidence, the carbon price as a concept may appear elusive and difficult to defend. Roe and Baker establish (2007) that, because of positive feed-back mechanisms of the climate system, it is unlikely that we will better understand the temperature sensitivity to emissions in the near future. The economic literature modeling the learning of climate impacts has almost exclusively focused on the structural uncertainties of the climate system, including those related to the climate sensitivity (Kelly and Kolstad 1999; Leach 2007 ; Kelly and Tan 2013) and to unknown thresholds leading to tipping points (Lemoine and Traeger 2014; Cai, Judd, and Lontzek, 2013) . For many economists, such climate uncertainties and the implied low-probability but high-consequence events, which cannot be ruled out by new information any time soon, have become the prime argument for having a price for carbon (Weitzman, 2009 (Weitzman, , 2011 (Weitzman, , 2013 Pindyck 2013 ). 3 1 Most evaluations of the social cost of carbon build on a set of middle-of-the-road assumptions on climate change impacts, commonly expressed in terms of GDP losses, and then use climate-economy models such as DICE, FUND, or PAGE (see Greenstone, Kopits, and Wolverton, 2011 , for a succinct description and references) that combine the impact assumptions with background scenarios to obtain a monetized value for the social cost. There is a pressing demand for such a number as it is required, for example, in the cost-benefit analyses to assess regulations across wide domains; however, see Pindyck (2013) for a critical review of the integrated-assessment models used in producing the numbers. 2 See IPCC (2014) for a survey on methods and results. There is a growing empirical literature on how climate impacts various sectors of the economy (e.g., Deschenes and Greenstone, 2007 , and Schlenker and Roberts, 2009, Dell, Jones, and Olken, 2012). 3 See also Lange and Treich (2008) , and Heal and Millner (2013) for surveys on uncertainties in climate-change economics.
Accepting climate-change "unknowns" as reasons for beliefs supporting a current price for carbon, in this paper we argue that the reason for sustaining and increasing the price over long periods without hard evidence is fundamentally different and a wellunderstood economic variable: the growth of global income. For the coming century, the global income is expected to grow by multiple factors, in part due to the rise of the middle class in major emerging economies. 4 The US government has recently developed estimates for the carbon price, for regulatory purposes, assuming that the global GDP increases by a factor that varies between five and seven in this time-span (see Greenstone et al., 2011 ).
An economy grown five to seven times bigger values information on the social cost of climate change differently -but how exactly? For the contributions of income and beliefs to the social cost, we develop a tractable climate-economy model where impacts are initially neither observed nor experienced -they may arrive through a hidden-state impact response characterized by long delays and dependence on the past emissions history.
We develop policy rules that separate sharply the carbon price determinants that are clearly understood, such as the size of the economy, from those that involve beliefs about future impacts. In contrast with the general tone of the previous literature, "threats" originating from the natural science uncertainties of the climate problem are not the source of time-increasing carbon prices. 5 The well-understood part, that is, the expansion of the economic stake through the growth of the global economy is enough. We find conditions when carbon prices grow faster or slower than the economy. The price should grow faster than the economy if the current level of climate change cannot generate impacts substantial enough for learning the true social cost. Weyant et al. 2006 ). 5 By the nature of our quantitative exercise below, we rule out "tail events". The supporting potential high-damage climate event that justifies the estimated initial carbon price is equivalent to a GDP-loss of about 10 per cent at temperatures that are 3 degrees Celsius above the pre-industrial level. Such an event is economically significant but not a "tail event"in the sense of Weitzman (2009) where policies become undefined since, effectively, it is not possible to transfer wealth to the high consequence events; see, for example, Nordhaus (2010) and Millner (2013).
very large. Considering carbon prices for such a "no news is good news" scenario, we intentionally devise a conservative test for a climate policy ramp, that is, a gradual tightening of policies as advocated by previous studies (Nordhaus, 2007) . 6 Taking a dataset of estimates for the social cost as a representation of current beliefs, put together by Tol (2009) in a study of existing estimates, we quantify how these initial social cost perceptions would have to change to overturn the contribution of rising income to the carbon price. To reverse the upward trend of the carbon price, the climate experts would have to become more optimistic, and rule out severe impacts on the economy, by orders of magnitude faster than what is implied by the scenario in our explorative calibration.
Arguably, the distribution of existing estimates arises from fundamental differences between the individual studies, introducing a strong subjective component to the estimates (see Pindyck, 2013) . The subjective dispersion of views is exactly the reason why, in our framework, beliefs are introduced for interpreting the existing carbon price distribution. The approach to the calibration of beliefs is explorative; however, the general conclusions seem quantitatively robust. We are unaware of previous attempts to use current estimates of the social cost for assessing its dynamic development.
Interestingly, through growth, the economy may become fully decarbonized without experiencing economic climate-change impacts. The key by-product of income growth for climate policies is the increased willingness to pay for emissions reductions; Chichilnisky, Heal, and Starrett (1993) discuss a similar effect in a static context, and Stokey (1998) considers the effect in a dynamic setting. In our model with long-delayed learning, the pollution impact on the economy may not occur but the carbon emissions still experience a rise and decline much in the vein of the Environmental Kuznets curve -literature Krueger, 1993, 1995 that follows from the description of the global carbon cycle; this description is in full detail in Gerlagh and Liski (2013) . 7 In Section 3, we first introduce the optimal policies when the true state of nature is known, and then consider the policy before learning the impacts. Section 4 introduces the calibration and the quantitative assessment. The online supplementary file contains a program for reproducing the graphs in the text. 8 2
The climate-economy model
The basic setting
We consider a climate-economy planning problem where production possibilities at time t depend on capital k t inherited, and potentially also on the full history of carbon input use,
Given k t and history s t at time period t, consumption, c t , and carbon inputs, z t , are chosen to maximize the expected discounted utility
where 0 < δ < 1 is the discount factor and u t+τ is the periodic utility, specified below.
The chosen allocations must satisfy
with y t = f t (k t , s t , z t ) denoting the output at time t. Losses due to climate change arise as reduced output, and depend on the history of emissions s t through variable D t that is a measure of the global mean temperature increase above the pre-industrial levels at time t. We assume that this measure is a function of history s t ,
where the weights R(τ ) define the "emissions-temperature response". That is, current emissions z t affect temperatures at some later time t + τ according to a known response function R(τ ): 7 A longer working paper version Gerlagh and Liski (2012) contains a detailed description of the energy sector that is needed in the quantitative analysis of the current paper. That paper focuses on the valuation of far-distant climate impacts, without uncertainty. 8 Follow the link https://www.dropbox.com/sh/7meos655j14jh5p/_dlr8X_FHI
The key characteristic of the calibrated R(τ ), explained below, is the considerable delay of the response following an impulse of emissions; it has a non-linear shape peaking several decades after the date of the emissions, and a fat tail of almost permanent impacts. Simplistically, there is no uncertainty about R(τ ); the response serves the purpose of introducing delays to the potential impacts on the economy that, in turn, will be uncertain.
Output is given by a production function where capital contribution takes the Cobb-Douglas form, with 0 < α < 1,
where the contribution of carbon inputs z t enter through the function A t (z t ) that captures the energy sector of the economy. Our quantitative analysis captures the total factor productivity development of the economy as well as the energy sector through A t but, since our analytical results do not require a specific form for A t , we postpone the detailed discussion of A t to Section 4.4. Here, we merely assume that carbon input z t has a positive but diminishing marginal product.
Losses from climate change arise as reduced output, as in most applied climateeconomy models (e.g., Nordhaus, 2008) . Moreover, they depend on the history of emissions through variable D t and damage coefficient ∆ y,t 0, as in Golosov et al. (2014) . 9
There are two climate-economy states, I t ∈ {0, 1}. If I t = 0, no damages have been experienced by t. If I t = 1, damages have appeared, and once I t = 1, then I t+τ = 1 for all τ ≥ 0. The damage coefficient at time t is ∆ y,t = ∆ y I t , where ∆ y > 0 is a constant, independent of time. Thus, there is a dichotomy between climate change, captured by D t , and impacts, ∆ y,t , where only the latter will be unknown. 10 The economy starts with ∆ y,t = 0; below, we specify the learning process for the future values of ∆ y,t > 0. 9 Note that we do not impose an upper limit for the total use of carbon inputs, implying that the exhaustible-resource nature of such inputs is ignored. The assumption is motivated by the size of carbon deposits in the form of coal that exceeds absorptive of capacity of the atmosphere. See Gerlagh (2011) and van der Ploeg and Withagen (2012). 10 The dichotomy can be broken by assuming a smooth arrival process for impacts; the extension, discussed in the concluding Section and presented in the Appendix, can be interpreted this way. The approach in the main text allows sharper analytics, and the substance-related differences between the two approaches are small.
Periodic utility is
where u (c t ) = ln(c t ), ∆ u,t = ∆ u I t , and ∆ u 0. We thus allow for intangible damages that can appear together with the production losses, once I t = 1.
The economic problem defined through (1)-(6) has a well-explored structure, apart from the climate-economy interactions. The state vector is (k t , s t , I t ). Because of the log-utility for consumption, full capital depreciation in one period, and Cobb-Douglas capital contribution, the consumption choice model follows Brock and Mirman (1972) so that share g = αδ of gross output will be saved; the dynamic programming arguments leading to this policy are well known in analytical macro-economics (Sargent, 1987) . Moreover, given the exponential form for the potential output loss, the contribution of k t and s t to value of the program in (1) will be separable in these variables. Thus, the climate policy analysis can be conducted by taking savings g as given and by tracking the direct utility impacts of the potential loss from climate change. 11 It proves useful to aggregate both the potential output and direct utility losses into one measure:
Remark 1 For I t = 1, the present-value loss of utils from marginal climate change at
Thus, in equilibrium, output and direct utility losses can be made interchangeable in terms of utility; for convenience, we will use ∆ as an aggregate measure of both losses. For the proof, consider the effect of temperature D t+τ on utility in period t + τ when I t = 1 (climate impacts have arrived). Recall that the consumption utility is ln(c t+τ ) = ln((1 − g)y t+τ ) = ln(1 − g) + ln(y t+τ ) so that, through the exponential output loss, the consumption utility loss is given by ∂ln(c t+τ )/∂D t+τ = −∆ y . As there is also the direct utility loss, captured by ∆ u in (6), the full loss in utils at t + τ is
But, part g of the output loss at t + τ also propagates through savings to period t + τ + 1 and further to periods t + τ + n with n > 0, so that the full loss of utils, discounted to time t and denoted by ∆, is given by (7) 
Beliefs
The hazard rate for damages, denoted as p, is the probability that damages start and I t = 0 moves to I t+1 = 1. The hazard rate is a given constant for each period, but unknown to the policy maker. We assume that p has a discrete prior distribution: it can either take value p = 0 or p = λ. The hazard rate can depend on the degree of climate change as measured by D t , for example, so that only for periods where D t > D 0 the state can switch. We postpone this extension in Section 3.3, and assume now learning in all periods by setting D = 0. 12
There is no prior climate experiment; we do not know the value of p, but we assume a subjective prior probability µ 0 > 0 for a positive hazard rate, p = λ. The probability for eventual climate impacts satisfy:
1 − µ 0 = Pr( lim t→∞ I t = 0) = Pr(p = 0) µ 0 = Pr( lim t→∞ I t = 1) = Pr(p = λ > 0).
Let µ t denote the posterior probability that p = λ, at time t, conditional on no learning by time t, I t = 0. Each period where D t > D = 0, but where no damages have appeared so far, I t = 0, climate change runs an experiment. If the outcome is I t+1 = 1, which happens with probability µ t λ > 0, we have learned that p = λ, so µ t+1 = 1. If the outcome is I t+1 = 0, we have not learned the state of nature with certainty, but the beliefs are updated to µ t+1 . We can write the Bayesian updating rule as 13 µ t = Pr(p = λ |I t = 0)
which is the probability that climate change impacts will ultimately arrive even though such damages have not been experienced by time t. Note that µ t declines over time:
"no news is good news"; the assessment of the distribution for damages becomes more optimistic over time. 14 The triple (µ t , λ, ∆) describes the current beliefs, the underlying stochastic process for damages, and the size of damages, respectively. 12 For example, D can correspond to 2-degrees Celsius warming, but since we have little information about the learning thresholds, we will set D = 0 in the calibration. The solution of the model can be easily extended to the case of different temperature brackets, all having different hazard rates. 13 Note that Pr(p = λ |I t = 0 ) × Pr(I t = 0) = Pr(p = λ ∩ I t = 0). The probability that there has been no news by time t is Pr(I t = 0) = µ 0 (1 − λ) t + 1 − µ 0 . The probability that there has been no news by time t and that p = λ is Pr(p = λ ∩ I t = 0) = µ 0 (1 − λ) t . Combining gives the equation. 14 
Climate dynamics
The temperature response to emissions is a key determinant of the expected present-value utility impacts of the current emissions, that is, the social cost of carbon emissions. For tractable policies, we build on a closed-form for R(τ ) that is derived in Gerlagh and Liski (2013); see Theorem 1. For exposition, we outline here the two main determinants of the response: the carbon cycle and the relationship between carbon concentrations and temperatures.
The carbon cycle refers to a diffusion process of carbon between reservoirs of carbon, such as those in the atmosphere, oceans and biosphere. Obviously, the atmospheric reservoir is the one relevant for climate warming but the other reservoirs are relevant for the delays and persistencies of changes in the atmospheric stock. Assuming a linear diffusion, the system can be de-coupled by eliminating interactions between the reservoirs, leading to an isomorphic system of separable impulse-responses for carbon stocks (Maier-Reimer and Hasselman 1987). Let I denote the set of impulse-responses, with fraction 0 < a i < 0 of emissions having decay rate 0 η i < 1, i ∈ I. The shares and decay rates have intuitive meanings, discussed below, and they follow from the physical description reasonable to think that, for example, a long period of 2-degrees warming without impacts is evidence for not having impacts at such temperatures. Even if one considers "no news is good news" learning to be biased, this bias is consistent with the idea of having a conservative test against the climate policy ramp, as explained in the Introduction.
of the system of carbon reservoirs. 15 The carbon cycle is relatively well understood in natural sciences but the relationship between temperatures and carbon concentrations is fundamentally uncertain (see, for example, Roe and Baker, 2007) . Acknowledging these complications, we note that economic impacts introduce yet another layer of fundamental uncertainty; we focus on this uncertainty and make the following simplistic assumptions on the determinants of the climate equilibrium. Emissions z t increase the atmospheric CO 2 stock, through the carbon cycle, and there is a linear relationship between the steady state atmospheric CO 2 stock and the steady state level of D t . This relationship is captured by parameter π: a one-unit increase in the steady-state atmospheric CO 2 stock leads to a π-unit increase in the steady-state level of D t . Outside steady state, there is a delay in the effect from concentrations to temperatures, and this delay is captured by parameter 0 < ε < 1: a one-unit increase in emissions increases the next period CO 2 stocks one-to-one but the direct temperature increase is only επ -units
Remark 2 Consider a carbon diffusion process, described by shares 0 < a i < 0 for depreciation rates 0 η i < 1, i ∈ I. For temperature sensitivity π and adjustment speed ε, the impact of emissions at time t on temperatures at time t + τ is
The result follows from Gerlagh and Liski (2013, Theorem 1). Parameter η i captures, for example, the carbon uptake from the atmosphere by forests and other biomass, and oceans. 
there is no response, R(τ ) = 0. When multiplying temperature measure D t by given output-loss coefficient ∆ y > 0, we can interpret the emissions-temperature response as an emissions-damage response. 18 These quantitative choices parametrize the emissions-temperature response that is depicted in Figure 1 . In the calibration below, we allow ∆ y to be determined by the distribution for the carbon prices obtained from previous studies; throughout, ∆ y = 1 refers to the Nordhaus' baseline.
3 General-equilibrium policies 3.1 After learning, I = 1
To obtain the carbon price, that is, the social cost of current carbon emissions z t , consider the effect of emissions at t on a stream of future utilities. The full loss of utils per increase of temperatures as measured by D t+τ , caused by z t at time t, when discounted to t with factor 0 < δ < 1, is denoted by h. It follows with the aid of (7) and (9):
The present-value utility costs of current emissions can thus be compressed to a number, h, that will be an input to the determination of the currently optimal carbon price.
The first term, δ∆π, describes the utility loss associated with one emission unit when steady state damages would happen immediately at the next period. The second term discounts damages because of the time-delay associated with temperature adjustment.
The third term with the summation describes the persistence of damages as the atmospheric CO 2 stock decays slowly. 18 To clarify the units, the damages are measured per Teraton of CO2 [TtonCO2], and the 3 degrees Celsius rise follows from doubling the CO 2 stock. We have chosen the value of π such that the normalization ∆ y = 1 gives the Nordhaus case. For this reason, the interpretation of π is "climate damage sensitivity" rather than "climate sensitivity".
Proposition 1 Conditional on I t = 1, the optimal carbon price is
Thus, the optimal carbon price in (12) is proportional to income, with proportionality depending only on δ, ∆, and the carbon cycle parameters in (9) . Given loss parameter ∆, the same tax is optimal for any division between utility and production losses satisfying (7) .
For the proof, given the Brock-Mirman structure (1972), the payoff implications of temperature changes are separable from capital capital wealth. The climate policy can be found by balancing the present-value of future utility costs of emissions (11) with the current utility-weighted marginal product of carbon: ∂yt ∂zt ∂u ∂c = h. Since ∂ut ∂ct = 1/c t = 1/(1 − g)y t , we can express the optimal carbon price as
which gives the result.
The optimal tax is proportional to income, following since, effectively, through the Brock-Mirman structure we assume a unit elasticity of losses with respect to income. 
Given our model of learning, we find for the distribution of Z that
which gives the probability that damages turn positive exactly after τ periods when the current time t subjective belief for the climate problem is µ t . To find the corresponding cumulative distribution function for the utility losses, denoted by F t (Z), we first establish the probability that the damage has revealed itself at period t, irrespective of if t is the first time:
We can generalize this to expectations at period t,
so that the distribution for Z is then given by
We can use this distribution to determine the social cost of carbon at time t as dependent on beliefs µ t .
Theorem 1 Conditional on no experience of impacts by time t (I t = 0), the previousperiod distribution of the social cost of carbon F t−1 (Z) stochastically dominates the current distribution F t (Z). The social cost of carbon as measured by h t = E t Z declines over time conditional on I t = 0. Moreover,
Proof. The expected utility losses from current emissions are equal to
Using our temperature-response function leads to the expression for h t . Decreasing carbon prices measured in utils and stochastic dominance follow from (13) and µ t decreasing over time.
The result gives a closed-form expression for the optimal carbon price policy depending both on the climate system parameters and on the current belief of the damage distribution characterized by (µ t , λ, ∆). The first term that defines h l equals h, the full information policy variable (defined in (11) . The second term subtracts the present value of damages that in expectations do not occur, substituting δ(1 − λ) for the discount factor.
Recall that the optimal general-equilibrium carbon price is the income-weighted future utility-cost of current actions, analogous to (12) , giving:
The optimal learning-adjusted carbon price is
The results follows from the same arguments as for the full information case, using Theorem 1 for the expected future utility-costs.
The "climate policy ramp", that is, the gradually tightening carbon-price policy over time, can follow even with increasing climate optimism over time: despite the declining µ t , sufficient growth of income growth y t , implies that the economy becomes, in expected terms, more exposed to losses from climate change.
Limiting cases reveal the mechanisms at work. Consider time t = 0, where the subjective belief of damages is given by µ 0 < 1. If damages are almost surely observable, λ ր 1, the optimal initial policy prior to experimentation is the full information policy, weighted with the subjective probability for damages, h l → h. However, if damages do not appear the next period, I 1 = 0, then the subjective assessment µ 1 drops to zero by the updating rule (8) as beliefs become very optimist, and the carbon price drops to zero, the temperature and associated potential impact of emissions reaches its maximum immediately after the date of emissions, which is hard to reconcile with the carbon cycle representations of the applied models typically used for carbon pricing. 19 Second, we introduce a structure for beliefs and their tractable updating (8) so that the carbon price has a closed form and the contributions of beliefs and income become explicit in (14) .
Moreover, we will exploit in a following section the closed-form distribution of Z in (13) to connect the quantitative assessment to carbon price estimates in the literature.
Learning thresholds
Before moving to the quantitative assessment, consider the case the degree of climate change determines the intensity of experimentation. Suppose learning takes place only above a temperature threshold, D t ≥ D, corresponding, for example, to 1 or 2 degrees Celsius above the pre-industrial temperature levels. 19 Gerlagh and Liski (2013) compare the emissions-damage responses of DICE-2007, Golosov et al.
2014, and the one presented here. Moreover, the supplementary material of that paper contains a note that illustrates the importance of the non-monotonicity of the response in replicating the carbon price predictions of the applied climate-economy models.
Proposition 3 Assume that temperatures generate information on impacts only if D t ≥
D. Let D 0 < D and t ′ < ∞ be the first period such that D t ′ D. Then, prior to t ′ , the expected present-value utility impact of emissions increases over time: h t < h t+1 for
Proof. Let T be the set of periods τ such that D τ D. The expected utility losses
The second line follows because I t = 0 with certainty for 0 < t < t ′ . The inequality follows as we subtract one period to take one period of delay away. The fifth line follows as beliefs do not change between t and t + 1.
As long as no information can be obtained, no damages will occur but policy h t becomes more strict over time as the expected first appearance of damages comes closer.
The tightening of policies continues until the temperatures start generating information.
Proposition 4 For 0 < t < t ′ , defined in Proposition 3, the optimal carbon tax grows faster than the economy.
Since the actual carbon tax is a multiple of income, the tax implied by h t for D t < D will be growing over time at a rate exceeding the growth of the economy, by Proposition 3. Further, recall that our emissions-temperature response implies that the temperature peak for a given emissions impulse lags 60-70 years behind the date of emissions: the learning of effects described here can start several decades after the emissions that caused climate change to break through the threshold. Meanwhile, optimal policies are characterized by constant beliefs, but by potentially sharply increasing carbon prices.
The shape of the emissions-temperature response, R(τ ) is thus not only important as a measure of the development over time for the potential shock on the economy; it also dictates how quickly the climate experiment can become informative. The result above can be extended to a more sophisticated representation of arrival rates, depending on the temperature level. However, in the interest of designing a conservative test for the climate policy ramp, we assume that any level of temperature increase allows learning of the climate impacts on the economy in the quantitative analysis below. Moreover, our approach ignores the possibility of learning the climate impacts from the shorterterm temperature volatility (see, for example, Kelly and Tan 2013); in the Appendix, we extend the tractable carbon price formula to this case.
Quantitative assessment
Throughout the quantitative analysis, we assume 10-year periods; the first year is '2010' corresponding to period 2006-2015. We assume only (potential) output losses from climate change so that ∆ y = ∆ and ∆ u = 0, to maintain an easy comparison with earlier studies. We take the Gross Global Product as 600 Trillion Euro [T euro] for the decade, 
Matching carbon price distributions
For an informed approach to quantifying the belief component in the model, we use now a distribution of existing carbon price estimates as external data. The underlying idea in this, admittedly unorthodox, calibration is that each number in the data presents a point estimate of the social cost. Our model gives a structural interpretation for the dispersion of the estimates, allowing calibration of the parameters that quantify the initial beliefs in the model. The policy-maker, that is, the decision-maker in the model, then forms one initial point estimate for the social cost, and evaluates its evolution over time given the learning dynamics assumed. 21 Tol (2009) conducted a comprehensive survey of the existing estimates for the social cost of carbon. From a sample of 232 estimates he derived a distribution for the carbon price measured in 1995 USD/tC, controlling for the time discount rates used in the studies. We focus on Tol's sample corresponding to 1 percent pure rate of time preference. 22 Tol's mean value for the carbon price is 32.7 for 2010 EUR/tCO 2 (his Table 2 , 2009). We calibrate the climate system parameters as reported in Section 2.3 and choose economic parameters as stated above, and then fit our cumulative damage distribution function F (Z) by choosing the initial prior µ 0 , hazard rate λ, and damage parameter ∆. Note that in this interpretation of the data, the heterogeneity in the point estimates comes from different possible outcomes for the arrival date of the damage. The approaches are almost outcome-equivalent. We followed the latter approach to allow for the interpretation set out below.
There is a mass point at zero, corresponding to a 20 per cent assessment that in- 21 The social cost of carbon is an elusive concept in the applied work that has generated the data discussed below. Many of the studies do not optimize to find the optimal shadow value of the current carbon constraint; rather, the cost of carbon is the evaluated cost from a marginal increase of emissions given a background scenario for the economy; see, for example, the model descriptions in the Stanford Energy Modeling Forum (in Weyant et al, 2006) . Our planner optimizes the social cost which, obviously, differs from the non-optimized estimates but is not necessarily inconsistent with them. 22 Tol reports distributions for 0, 1 and 3 per cent discount rates, respectively. Our analysis of the 3percent case produced very similar qualitative results; the levels of the policy variables are systematically lower. significant or positive climate change impacts will occur. 23 For interpretation, we may think that 1 − µ 0 represents the share of climate experts having the assessment that climate-change impacts will be negligible or even positive; to match the lower end of the distribution, we set µ 0 = .8.
In the other extreme, there are experts who have strong views that income losses are high, arrive almost surely and soon: the high end of the carbon prices pins down the value for ∆ y , assuming immediate sure loss of output. To avoid giving too much weight to a few extreme cost estimates in the sample, we truncated the fitted distribution at 87.7 The matching of our carbon price distribution with Tol's distribution ensures consistency between our quantitative assessment of the first-period social cost of carbon and the views as held by the profession; updating of the distribution depends on our structural interpretation of the learning process.
The climate-policy ramp
The above calibration sets the optimal initial carbon price at the mean in Tol's survey: 32.7 EUR/tCO 2 in 2010. Consider now the development of the optimal carbon price over time. We set D = 0, assuming that any level of temperature increase produces information.
Given the closed-form formula for the carbon price in (14) , one approach is to conjecture future output or income levels, say, in 2050 and, conditional on no observed impacts by that time, obtain the future carbon price for that state of the world. However, future states of the world result partly from past policy decisions; carbon pricing decisions shape the current, and through investments, also future income levels. For consistent policy scenarios, in Section 4.4 we specify and calibrate a structure for the energy sector and total productivities through A t (z t ) in the production function. The scenarios presented here are based on this specification.
The benchmark for our assessment is the "Climate policy ramp" (dotted line in Fig.   3 ), based on Nordhaus' DICE (2007) middle-of-the-road damage estimate, corresponding to ∆ y = 1 sure-loss damages; that is, damages are immediately observed with no uncertainty. For 2010, with 1 per cent annual pure time-discounting and log-utility, the benchmark sure-loss policy path gives 22 EUR/tCO 2 as the optimal price which is almost identical to what DICE produces under this choice for discounting and preferences. 24 This middle-of-the-road sure-loss path involves a tightening of the policies over the coming century, typical for most no-uncertainty climate-policy assessments.
We now look at the optimal time path for the carbon price for high potential damages, but conditional on not observing these damages; that is, we consider the evolution of the policy when future impacts are potentially severe, ∆ y = 4, as determined by the calibration procedure above, but when no news on climate impacts arrive. Then, we compare this policy path to the baseline. Without impacts, the economy is unaffected by climate change but, since the carbon policies are in place, emissions and output will be reduced below the business-as-usual path. The optimal carbon price is depicted as a solid line in Fig. 3 over the coming century and beyond. The two climate policies -one with immediate damages based on the central estimate, and the other with high but only potential damages and gradual updating of beliefs to the no-news situation-have the same shape for the first century. 25 The main result of the quantitative assessment follows: policies should become tighter over time even if climate optimism increases. Strikingly, for this particular learning scenario, it takes close to 200 years without observed climate damages for beliefs to become optimistic enough for the carbon price to decline -the social cost of carbon declines very slowly. To assess the shape of the carbon price path, we decompose its level into its two main components. Recall that the optimal carbon price is proportional to h t capturing the expected utility losses from current emissions, and to income y t ; τ t = h t (1 − g)y t , h t = µ t h l . See Table 1 , for the contribution of income (y t ) and learning (µ t ) to the carbon price. 26 Expected income growth is prodigious; in our evaluation, based on the IPCC scenarios (see Section 4.4 below), income rises five-fold during the coming century.
Such an estimate is not unheard of, and is driven by an increasing population and the rise of the middle class in emerging economies. The development of beliefs is captured 25 The difference in levels follows since the baseline estimate by Nordhaus is close to the median, but lower than the mean in Tol's distribution. 26 It is illuminating to consider the units of measurement for the utility loss measure h t = µ t h l , which has the same unit as the constant in the legend of the table: years through µ t in the Table. Observing no major climate damages over the coming century, leads to substantial increase in optimism, but, as is evident from the Table, it is the changing scale of the global economy that matters for the development of carbon pricing.
The stake affected by the potential inverse income shocks from climate change increase so much that stabilizing carbon prices at the initial level -thus ruling out a climate policy ramp completely -would require that the climate experiment is by orders of magnitude more informative than considered here. The assessment of the probability of major utility losses, as captured by µ t , would need to decline by 50 per cent by 2050. ppm. Even when CO 2 emissions fall to zero before 2100, it is expected that atmospheric CO 2 concentrations will not drop below 400 ppm before the end of the century, and stay above 350 ppm for centuries to come. In that sense, the climate is not expected to return to its natural state for a long period, and carbon prices continue to rise with income. For this reason, the economy becomes decarbonized during the coming century (Section 4.4);
the combination of rising incomes and the persistence of carbon concentrations leads to an Environmental Kuznets Curve for the observables of the economy.
Bad news
It may seem surprising that carbon prices under learning, as depicted in Fig. 3 , reach such high levels, despite that no actual damages take place. The persistence of climate policies depends on the slow decline of the posterior for damages but also the fact that the bad news arrival is a more severe outcome for an economy grown bigger. To describe the latter determinant of persistence, we define the bad news carbon price as the socially optimal price at time t if bad news arrive at time t. That is, I t = 1 holds for the first time at t so that the income-dependent carbon price is the one determined in Section 3.1. Fig. 4 depicts both the no news and bad news carbon price paths for the near and longer terms. Note that the bad news price path is "virtual" because it is drawn for an economy in which the output is not dynamically adjusted due to past damages to obtain the bad news price for any given t; otherwise, time t would not be the first arrival date of damages. 27 The starting level is given by our calibration at 87.7 EUR/tCO 2 , as this is the highest price estimate that we pulled from Tol's survey and applied to the immediate arrival of impacts. The virtual price increases for a long period of time reflecting the expanding economic stake for losses. 27 The immediate loss of output at time t is accounted for in the calculation of the tax but then again ignored when moving to t + 1 to obtain a consistent bad news price for t + 1.
Decarbonization
In Fig. 5 we depict the development of the energy sector when the economy does not experience climate-change impacts but faces the optimal no news tax as shown in Fig. 3 .
All energy is measured in CO 2 -equivalents; "carbon energy"gives then directly the carbon dioxide emissions per decade. Interestingly, the economy becomes fully decarbonized even without observed impacts. Clearly, the result depends on the substitution possibilities between carbon and non-carbon energy that we discuss in detail below. On reflection, the decarbonization without impacts is not unreasonable; the optimal carbon price levels imply substantial value providing incentives for the transition. Current We come to the end of the quantitative assessment by looking into the specific structure for the economy's production function (5) , used for the quantitative conclusions above. The specification is set up for a transparent calibration of the total and energy sector productivities. We assume
A t (l y,t , e t ) = min {A y,t l y,t , A e,t e t } (16)
l t = l f,t + l n,t + l y,t .
There are time-trends for total labor l t , and for labor productivities (A y , A e , A f , A n ) in output, total energy, fossil-fuel energy, and non-carbon energy production, respectively.
Total energy, e t , depends effectively only on labor allocation at time t: the core allocation problem in the energy sector is how to allocate a given total labor l t at time t between final output l y,t , fossil-fuel energy, l f,t , and non-carbon energy, l n,t . Thus, the climate policy steers the labor allocation (l y,t , l f,t , l n,t ) t≥0 and thereby the quantities of fossil-fuel, e f,t , and non-carbon energy, e n,t . Both energy sources are intermediates, summing up to the total energy input, e t = e f,t + e n,t . The allocation outcome depends only on time and carbon inputs; labor-energy composite A t (l y,t , e t ) is then equivalent to the total factor productivity term A t (z t ) in the economy's production function (5) .
Labor-energy composite A t (l y,t , e t ) takes a Leonfief form capturing an extremely low elasticity of substitution between labor in the final-good sector l y,t and energy e t . By this assumption, we avoid unrealistically deep early reductions of emissions through substitution of labor inputs, and thereby approximate the energy sector capital adjustment delays; see also Hassler, Krusell and Olovsson (2012) . A cost of the assumption is that the output-energy intensity remains fixed so that energy savings cannot arise as a source of emissions reductions; the reduction path for emissions in Fig. 5 is achieved through decarbonization, that is, substitution away from carbon energy.
In (18), we assume that e f,t can be produced with a constant-returns to scale technology using labor l f,t and the fossil-fuel z t , where A f,t and B t describe productivities.
The fuel resource is not a fixed factor and commands no resource rent; as in Golosov et al. (2014) , the fossil-fuel resource is in principle unlimited. In contrast, in equation (19),
where ϕ > 0 describes the elasticity of supply from the non-carbon sector; the non-fossil fuel energy production is land-intensive and subject to diminishing returns and land rents (as in Fischer and Newell, 2008 
Concluding Remarks
We developed a tractable climate-economy model that allows a stylized but transparent and self-contained quantitative assessment of the optimal carbon price when the impacts of climate change can only be learned gradually over time. Rather than producing another estimate for the carbon price, we took the distribution of the existing estimates as given and provided a structural interpretation for it, stemming from the strong subjective components in the estimates. This paper is the first attempt to use the current estimates in a quantitative assessment of the robustness of climate policies. The optimal carbon pricing policies are robust to significant delays in obtaining hard evidence on the socioeconomic impacts of climate change; it is the size of the economy that drives the carbon price.
Since there is a pressing policy need for a meaningful estimate of the carbon price, it is important that the framework is detailed enough for replicating the more comprehensive applied climate-economy models that, despite their shortcomings, are currently used for regulatory purposes such as those reported in Greenstone but the rise of income increases the carbon price much in the same way as here.
The main observation that follows from the the carbon price formulas and their quantitative assessment is novel and likely to hold in more general settings: the trend in the optimal carbon price path is mostly driven by the expansion of the global economy and the resulting growth of the potential expected economic losses. Changes in impact assessments will likely have smaller impacts on optimal carbon policies.
Appendix: Extension to smooth learning
We consider the same model as in the main text but introduce smooth learning about the true damage parameters ∆ y and ∆ u . Assume that priors are normally distributed with mean µ ∆,y (µ ∆,u respectively) and variance σ 2 ∆,y (σ 2 ∆,u , resp.). Signals are the realizations of damages that come from the true distributions, but initially we cannot tell apart damages from weather volatility and those from more persistent climate impacts. For illustration, we consider the two cases separately: first, a log-normal distribution for output losses that lead to a normal distribution for utility impacts; and second, lognormal direct utility losses. For each case, we denote the posterior mean for ∆ y (∆ u ) based on cumulative experience at time t by µ t . There is 'no news' at time t when the posterior mean equals the prior mean, µ t = µ ∆,y (µ ∆,u respectively). We consider the carbon policy h t as defined in (12) , and study how h t develops; specifically, we test whether h t remains constant or declines when 'no news' appears. This allows us to see which formulation is consistent with the model in the main text.
Output losses: normally distributed utility impacts
Consider first output losses only (i.e., ∆ u = 0), and assume experienced (relative) losses given by
where the state of the climate captured by D t is observed, and output losses contain a stochastic signal for the persistent damage sensitivity Λ y,t = ∆ y + ε y,t with ε y,t ∼ N(0, σ 2 ε ) and i.i.d. across periods and also independent of ∆ y . We observe Λ y,t but cannot tell apart the contribution of the noise and the true damage that has an initial prior ∆ y ∼ N(µ ∆,y , σ 2 ∆,y ) with µ ∆,y > 0. Thus, in expectations, temperature causes output losses but there can also be temporary positive productivity shocks, ε y,t < 0.
Then, in this setting, we can apply the normal learning rule (De Groot, 1970) to see that after t observations, the posterior distribution for Λ y,τ , τ > t is given by 
where Λ y,t is the average observation after t observations. Thus, the future utility losses due to output reduction at τ > t can be obtained using the posterior at t:
We define the sure-loss policy as in the main text through h which gives the present-value utility losses for initial mean expectation µ ∆,y and σ 2 = 0.
Proposition 5 (output losses) The optimal policy at time t is proportional to the sureloss policy h,revised upwards or downwards only because of more pessimistic or optimistic beliefs on expected damages:
Proof. Follows directly from the independence between the variation in future impacts and the delay structure of impacts:
The proposition reveals no trend in carbon policies when no news arrives: h t = h 0 if µ t = µ y,∆ . From the perspective at t = 0, future policies h t have a normal distribution determined by the distribution of µ t : 
Direct utility losses: right-skewed utility impacts
Consider then utility losses only (i.e., ∆ y = 0), and assume that the damage parameter is log-normally distributed. As was the case in the main text, here, the level of policies will adjust in a "no news" scenario. Consider intangible damages in the periodic utility, having a log-normal distribution,
where Λ u,t = ∆ u + ε u,t ,
with zero-mean normal realizations ε u,t that are i.i.d. across periods and also independent of ∆ u . Here, too, the initial prior is normal, ∆ u ∼ N(µ ∆,u , σ 2 ∆,u ). Thus, again, the realized (experienced) damage depends on the unknown damage-generating process and on the noise term. As above, we obtain the expected intangible damage, after a given history of observed damages at time t; for notational convenience, we will now use for τ > t: Λ u,τ ∼ N(µ t , σ 2 t ). The expected damages then have a right-skewed distribution with potentially a fat tail for large damages, so that the expected future utility loss at τ > t is given by
where µ t = E[Λ u,τ ] and σ 2 t = V ar[Λ u,τ ] are given by the same equations as above for E[Λ y,t ] and V ar[Λ y,t ].
Proposition 6 (utility losses) The optimal policy at time t is revised upwards or downwards consistently with the updated damage estimate, but it also has a markup because of uncertainty, which declines through learning:
with
Proof. The proof follows from independence between variation in damages and the time structure of damages, see the previous proposition, with the damage coefficient defined through (28) .
The initial distribution for the carbon price (µ ∆,u and σ ∆,u ) can be calibrated to Tol's (2009) data as in the main text. Importantly, the policy at t = 0 immediately deviates
